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years province mean income per capita grew rapidly but diverged across provinces,
whereas intra-province income inequality grew rapidly but converged across provinces.
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1 Introduction
In the mid 1980s economic reform began in earnest in urban China. This involved the
gradual dismantling of central planning, the decentralization of decision-taking to
enterprises, and the emergence of markets. Reform of the labour market was tardy but both
the decentralization and the introduction of market forces were likely to affect wages and,
more generally, incomes. The changes occurred at different rates across provinces and
cities. A spatial analysis of urban wages and income per capita may therefore reveal
interesting patterns. Indeed, we show that this is the case, using two national household
surveys with data available at the microeconomic level. Between the survey years 1988
and 1995 province mean wages and incomes per capita grew rapidly but diverged across
provinces. Yet over the same period intra-province wage and income-inequality grew
rapidly but converged across provinces. We will analyse the extent of, and reasons for, the
convergence of inequality. We will also examine the divergence of means and its causes.
Our approach to understanding these processes is by means of various forms of
decomposition analysis.
The first of our questions—what happens to the spatial inequality of income inequality?—
has been posed rarely if at all; but the second—what happens to the spatial inequality of
mean incomes?—is now common. There is a lively and growing literature on economic
convergence across countries (for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: Chapter 12).
The same authors (1995: Chapter 11) also reported a number of regional studies of
convergence. They used measures of -convergence (the relation between changes in the
logarithm of income per capita and its initial value) and of - convergence (changes in the
standard deviation of the logarithm of income per capita). They found evidence of -
convergence among US states, Japanese prefectures and European regions, both absolute
and conditional convergence (standardising for other variables). They also generally found
-convergence. A likely explanation for these results, along with technological diffusion, is
that equilibrating flows of labour and capital tend to equalise incomes. Convergence
should accordingly be weaker when the equation is standardised for net migration.
However, the authors found, if anything, the opposite result, which they attributed to the
endogeneity of migration. As with cross-country convergence, cross-region convergence of
mean incomes is a common phenomenon that is not yet well understood.
Research on spatial income inequality in China has generally been conducted at the
province level. A good deal of such research is now being done on China, but the results so
far do not add up to a clear pattern—varying as they do according to time period, unit of
analysis, data set, dependent variable, and conditioning variables. One of the obvious
complications is that some areas which had a distinct locational and policy advantage, like
Guangdong and Fujian, and therefore have grown very rapidly, started off poor but in
recent years have been rich. For instance, Jian et al. (1996) examined inequality among
provinces over the period 1978-93, using data on provincial mean income per capita, based2
on the official national household survey. Their equations implied convergence during the
period up to 1985, but the evidence for the period after 1985 was weak. In neither case was
there evidence of conditional convergence or divergence; i.e. the effect of initial income on
its growth became insignificant when other explanatory variables were introduced into the
equation.
Another reason for the inconsistency of results is that there may be divergence at one level
of aggregation and convergence at another. Kanbur and Zhang (1999), using province-
level data on household consumption per capita, found that there was a sharp rise in the
contribution of the coast-inland difference to overall inequality over the period 1983-95,
and a fall in the contribution of intra-coastal and intra-inland inequality. They attributed
their contrasting results to the relative lack of long distance mobility. Similar findings of
province convergence within diverging regional ‘clubs’ (east, central and west China) were
obtained by Zhang et al. (2001) and Yao and Zhang (2001), both using province GDP per
capita data over the reform period 1978-97. The reasons for the recent absolute divergence
among provinces have been the subject of debate, the main distinction being between
geography and policy. Cai et al. (2002) found evidence of conditional convergence in
province GDP per capita over the period 1978-98. However, some of their conditioning
variables, such as the degree of marketization, were potentially influenced by initial GDP
per capita. Bao et al. (2002) similarly found that the coefficient on initial GDP per capita
was always negative in their test for conditional convergence among provinces over the
period 1978-97. As their conditioning variables were locational—e.g. length of coastline,
distance to coast—they argued that the absolute divergence among provinces was due to
the locational disadvantage rather then the poverty of some provinces. Nevertheless,
locational effects may have been strengthened by endogenous government policies. At one
extreme, the Special Economic Zones were established along the coast in the 1980s; at the
other, many cities in the interior were opened up to the world only in 1994 (Yang 2002).
Much of the literature does not distinguish between urban and rural areas, yet the
administrative and economic divide between urban and rural China makes it important to
analyse the two sectors separately. There are several studies of trends in inequality within
rural China but few studies for urban China. However, Jones et al. (2003), using city-level
data for the largest 200 cities, found great differences in growth rates of GDP per capita
over the period 1989-99. There was conditional convergence among cities after
standardization for such factors as Special Economic Zone status and foreign direct
investment; the authors thus attributed the absolute divergence largely to differential
policies of openness. Another study of urban China, by Xu and Zou (2000), used published
percentile income distribution data from the official urban household surveys over the
years from 1985 to 1995 to create estimates of urban income inequality within provinces.
They found this inequality to rise with the non-state share of employment and with the
growth rate of GDP, both measured at the province-level.3
As household-level data from the official national household surveys are not available to
researchers, we make use of two other national household surveys, for 1988 and 1995, in
order to analyse the change in inequality within as well as among provinces. The two
surveys were designed by a team comprising researchers at the Institute of Economics,
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and foreign scholars, and including the three
authors. They were conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics, drawing subsamples
from the samples used in the annual national household surveys. The rural and urban
samples were drawn separately, reflecting their administrative and economic differences.
In 1988, there were 9,009 households in the urban and 10,258 households in the rural
survey; in 1995 the corresponding figures were 6,931 and 7,998. Not all provinces could
be surveyed; there were 10 common provinces in the urban and 19 in the rural surveys.
The questionnaires were designed not only to describe income distribution in China but
also to explain it. The main results from the two projects were published in Griffin and
Zhao (1993) and Riskin et al. (2001). Some of the results of this paper are drawn from our
earlier work (Knight, Zhao and Li 2001).
2 Convergence in inequality
Why study income inequality at the province rather than at the national level? Inequality is
a matter of policy concern because it is perceived to create injustice, in an objective sense;
but also, in a subjective sense, to generate the dissatisfaction and unhappiness associated
with feelings of relative deprivation. People are more aware of the inequality they observe
than of the inequality they cannot observe; hence the likelihood that people are more
sensitive to income inequality within their province than across the nation. This is
particularly true of China, whose provinces are as large as countries in other parts of the
world and whose provincial governments have powers to redress inequality. This reasoning
provides a case for inquiring whether inequality has risen over time in the various
provinces.
Why study the inequality of intra-province inequality? Is it helpful to know whether intra-
province inequality has converged or diverged among provinces? Our objective here is
instrumental rather than ultimate. Patterns of convergence or divergence can be used to
understand the reasons why intra-province inequality has risen, and whether it will
continue to rise in the future. Our ultimate concern is with household income per capita
and not earnings per worker. However, in 1988 wage income represented 80 percent of
urban household income, and even in 1995, after a decade of urban economic reform, it
was as high as 77 percent. In order to understand the inequality of income, therefore, it is
necessary to investigate the inequality of labour earnings.
This section is divided into three parts. First, we test for divergence or convergence in
intra-province inequality across provinces over the period 1988-95. Second, we examine
the same relationship among cities. Third, we attempt to explain the convergence that we
observe. Our method is to attempt various decompositions of the growth in inequality that
occurred generally, but to varying degrees, over the seven years.4
2.1 Convergence in intra-province inequality among provinces
Table 1 shows the Gini coefficient of earnings per worker and household income per capita
in 1988 and 1995, and the change in the Gini coefficient, both the percentage change and
the change in percentage points. In all provinces except Gansu there was a rise in
inequality over the seven years. The increase in the Gini coefficient for the group of ten
provinces common to the urban samples was by 7.8 percentage points in the case of
earnings and 5.1 percentage points in the case of income. In each case the increase was
greater for the four coastal provinces than for the six inland provinces (9.1 versus 4.8
percentage points for earnings, and 6.4 versus 2.3 percentage points for income). There
was a good deal of variation among the provinces.
In order to discern patterns we estimated the following relationship:
G1 -G 0 = a+ b G 0 (1)
where G = the Gini coefficient and the subscripts 0, 1 = year 1988 and 1995 respectively.
The coefficient b is a test of convergence (b<0) or divergence (b>0). The coefficient
indicates whether the initial level of inequality hinders or assists its growth.
Table 1: The level and change in the Gini coefficient of earnings per worker and of income
per capita in urban China, 1988-95, by province
Earnings % Income %
1988 1995 Change 1988 1995 Change
Beijing 20.4 26.1 27.9 5.7 17.0 21.5 26.5 4.5
Shanxi 24.9 29.7 19.3 4.8 23.0 26.6 15.7 3.6
Liaoning 17.4 28.8 65.5 11.4 15.7 23.4 49.1 7.7
Jiangsu 18.3 28.8 57.4 10.5 17.4 23.2 33.3 5.8
Anhui 24.3 27.8 14.4 3.5 21.5 22.1 2.8 0.6
Henan 22.4 30.1 34.4 7.7 21.6 28.4 31.5 6.8
Hubei 18.5 27.7 49.7 9.2 18.1 22.5 24.3 4.4
Guangdong 27.7 33.1 19.5 5.4 24.9 28.6 14.9 3.7
Yunnan 19.7 23.1 17.3 3.4 19.8 21.5 8.6 1.7
Gansu 27.6 27.1 -1.8 -0.5 26.8 22.5 -16.0 -4.3
Coastal 23.8 32.9 38.2 9.1 21.3 27.7 30.1 6.4
Interior 23.3 28.1 20.6 4.8 22.0 24.3 10.5 2.3
Total 24.1 31.9 32.4 7.8 23.2 28.3 22.0 5.1
SD 3.84 2.64 -31.3 -1.20 3.63 2.77 -23.7 0.86
Note: The coastal region comprises Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, and Guangdong; the interior region comprises
Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Yunnan and Gansu.
Source: The data for this table, and for all subsequent tables except Table 9, are drawn exclusively from the
urban samples of the 1988 and 1995 national household surveys of the Institute of Economics, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS).5
Table 2 tests across provinces for convergence or divergence in the intra-province Gini
coefficient (columns 1 and 3). We see that the coefficient on initial inequality is
significantly negative. For both earnings per worker and income per capita, a reduction in
the initial Gini coefficient by 10 percentage points raises its subsequent growth over seven
years by 7 percentage points. When the proportionate growth in earnings or income is
added as an explanatory variable, its coefficient is positive but small and not statistically
significant (columns 2 and 4). When initial mean earnings or income is included, the
coefficient is positive but not at all significant (equations not shown).
Table 2: The inter-province relationship between initial Gini coefficient of earnings and
income and its growth, urban China, 1988-95
Increase in Gini coefficient (percentage points)
Earnings Income
Equation: 1 2 3 4
Intercept 21.993 *** 19.190 *** 17.147 13.426 *





2 0.512 0.542 0.422 0.410
F-value 10.449 ** 6.332 ** 7.556 ** 4.123 *
Mean value of dependent
variable
6.110 6.110 3.450 3.450
Number of observations 10 10 10 10
Note: ***denotes statistical significance at the one percent, **at the five percent, and *at the ten percent level.
Source: See Table 1.
2.2 Convergence in intra-city inequality among cities
Because there are only ten provinces in the urban sample, our results might be due to the
particular or idiosyncratic behaviour of one or two provinces. The same analysis cannot be
conducted on all 30 provinces because official intra-province inequality measures are not
available. However, information is available to estimate equation (1) for the 60 cities
common to our two surveys.
Table 3 shows powerful and statistically significant evidence of convergence in inequality
among cities. The coefficient b on G0 is no less than -0.92 in the case of income and -0.79
in the case of earnings, i.e. a 10 percent lower initial value of the Gini coefficient raises its
increment by 8 percentage points or more. A pattern is therefore established: the
convergence of inequality is a general phenomenon, applying not only among provinces
but also, even more powerfully, among cities.6
Table 3: The growth of the Gini coefficient of income per capita and earnings per worker,
1988-95, as a function of their initial values, by city, urban China
Change in the Gini
Income Earnings
Intercept 0.197 *** 0.202 ***
Initial value (G0) -0.922 *** -0.793 ***
Adj. R
2 0.589 0.489
F-value 84.158 *** 56.443 ***
Mean of dependent variable (G1 - G0) 0.015 0.031
Number of observations 60 60
Note: ***indicates statistical significance at the one percent level.
Source: See Table 1.
2.3 Explaining convergence
In all but one province urban inequality rose between 1988 and 1995, but it rose more
rapidly in those provinces which started with low inequality in 1988. The provinces were
becoming more similar in their degree of urban inequality. How is this trend to be
explained? One possibility is that the observed convergence is merely a statistical illusion:
the regression of the change in a variable on its initial value is subject to errors-in-variables
bias. Assume that measurement errors in the initial year and the final year are uncorrelated.
If the initial value is under-reported, the change is equivalently over-reported. This reduces
the estimated coefficient on the initial value, biasing it towards -1 and thus towards
convergence. The extent of the bias increases with the proportion of the variance in the
initial value that is attributable to measurement error. A common method of attempting to
correct for such bias—instrumenting the initial value by means of the value of a contiguous
year—is not open to us. Nor do we possess good proxies for the initial value (such as a
coastal dummy) that are not correlated with the error term of the dependent variable.
However, there are two pieces of evidence against the bias explanation.
First, we conducted a simple experiment to answer the question: what proportion of the
variation in the initial value would have to be the result of measurement error for
convergence to disappear? Accordingly, we set each initial province value 20 percent, and
then 50 percent, closer to the initial mean value. The coefficient on the initial Gini
remained significantly negative in the former case, and had a negative value exceeding -
0.3, albeit not significant, in the latter. Secondly, -convergence is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for -convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995:385). The former
tends to generate the latter, although this process can be offset by new disturbances that
increase dispersion. We find that between 1988 and 1995 -convergence occurred in every
case: the standard deviation of the Gini coefficient fell sharply among provinces (Table 1)
and also among cities; and the coefficient of variation even more. This is a further
indication that the -convergence observed is not an illusion.7
Our second approach is to conduct a decomposition analysis of the Gini coefficient in each
province in 1988 and 1995 by component of income, and then to decompose the rise in the
Gini coefficient between 1988 and 1995 into the contributions made by the different
components. We make use of the following property:
G =  i =  ui Ci (2)
Where
G = the Gini coefficient of income inequality
ui = the ratio of the i th component of income to total income, i.e. its share of the total
Ci = the concentration ratio of the i th component of income
i = the contribution of the i th component to the Gini coefficient.
The concentration curve Ci (x) represents the share of component i received by the lowest x
proportion of recipients of total income. The concentration ratio Ciis then derived from the
concentration curve in exactly the same way as the Gini coefficient is derived from the
Lorenz curve. The contribution made by each component of income to the Gini coefficient
is given by i = ui Ci.
We decompose the rise in the Gini coefficient of income per capita in each province
between 1988 and 1995 (Table 4). The contribution of each component is given by
i1 - i0, and the proportion due to each component by (i1 - i0)/(G1 -G 0). There is a
sharp coastal-interior contrast in the contribution of different income components to the
change in income inequality between 1988 and 1995. In the coastal region, wage income
was the main reason for increased inequality, whereas it made no contribution at all in the
interior region: there, inequality rose on account of pensions, self-employment income and
property income.
We are now in a position to examine the proximate causes of the inter-province
convergence of intra-province inequality. We estimate variants of equation (1):
i1 - i0 = a + bG 0 (3)
i1 - i0 = c+di0 (4)
Equation (3) indicates whether, and to what extent, a particular component of income
contributed to convergence in the Gini coefficient. Equation (4) indicates whether, and to
what extent, the contribution of a particular component was itself subject to convergence.
We see from Table 5 that wage income made much the largest contribution to the inter-
province convergence in the Gini coefficient. The contribution of each component was
itself strongly convergent except that of pensions. There is thus no single component8
responsible for the convergence that we seek to explain. The only component that we can
rule out is pensions, which appeared to have a divergent effect.
Table 4: Contribution of income components to the change in income inequality, urban
China, 1988-95 (%)
Province Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Change in Gini
coefficient of
income
Beijing 130.5 4.1 8.6 13.3 -56.5 100.0
Shanxi -89.3 157.5 26.3 33.0 -27.4 100.0
Liaoning 58.9 32.4 7.7 19.2 -18.1 100.0
Jiangsu 64.6 28.2 1.4 29.1 -23.3 100.0
Anhui -879.8 798.0 176.6 258.0 -252.8 100.0
Henan -6.2 117.2 13.7 9.8 -34.5 100.0
Hubei 87.8 9.1 9.3 28.1 -34.3 100.0
Guangdong 93.5 33.1 26.6 39.9 -93.1 100.0
Yunnan -189.9 183.3 28.1 128.5 -50.0 100.0
Gansu 77.8 -45.4 15.1 -35.8 88.3 100.0
Coastal 93.7 22.0 6.7 21.0 -43.4 100.0
Interior -18.9 119.3 26.7 58.2 -85.3 100.0
Total 76.2 37.5 10.1 25.8 -49.6 100.0
Notes: Y1 = wage income of workers; Y2 = pension and income of retired people; Y3 = earnings of private
owners and self-employed; Y4 = household property income; Y5 = other income. Coastal region includes
Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong; Interior region includes Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Yunnan and
Gansu.
Source: See Table 1.
Table 5: The inter-province relation between the contribution of a component to the
change in income inequality and the initial contribution of the component or the initial Gini
coefficient
The coefficient on the initial value of:
G0 0 i π
Wage income -0.681 * -0.917 **
Pension 0.187 0.427
Income from self-employment -0.011 -0.857 **
Property income 0.015 -1.117
Other income -0.169 * -1.108 ***
Note: ***denotes statistical significance at the one percent, **at the five percent, and *at the ten percent level.
Source: See Table 1.
Because of the importance of wages in producing the convergence of income inequality,
Table 6 re-estimates equations (3) and (4) for the components of earnings. The basic wage
made the greatest contribution to the convergence of the Gini coefficient. However, each
component was itself subject to convergence except the bonus, which was weakly, and not
significantly, divergent.9
Table 6: The inter-province relation between the contribution of a component to the
change in earnings inequality and the initial contribution of the component or the initial gini
coefficient
The coefficient on the initial value of:
G0 0 i π
Basic wage -0.302 -0.008
Bonus -0.101 0.101
Cash subsidy -0.105 -1.233 **
Income from self-employment -0.074 -1.020 **
Other earnings -0.147 -1.028 ***
Note: ***denotes statistical significance at the one percent, **at the five percent, and *at the ten percent level.
Source: See Table 1.
Table 7: The inter-province and inter-city relation between the gini coefficient of earnings,
and of income, and the proxy for the extent of reform, urban China, 1988
Earnings Income
Provinces Cities Provinces Cities
Intercept 26.704 27.663 *** 20.190 25.784 ***
Basic wage as a
percentage of earnings
-0.084 -0.115 * 0.007 -0.110*
Adj. R
2 -0.106 0.029 -0.125 0.031
F-value 0.135 2.701 * 0.001 2.898 *
Mean of dependent variable 22.120 21.431 20.586 19.828
Number of observations 10 60 10 60
Note: ***denotes statistical significance at the one percent, **at the five percent, and *at the ten percent level.
Source: See Table 1.
How then can we explain convergence, if it depended mainly on wage income and, within
wage income, on the basic wage? It is possible that convergence was due to the uneven
timing of reforms. Those provinces and cities which reformed early—during the period
1985-88—had higher inequality by 1988. In these cases inequality did not rise much more
between 1988 and 1995. Those provinces and cities which commenced reforms later had
lower inequality in 1988 but higher increases in the ensuing seven years. To test this
hypothesis we need to measure the progress in reform that had been achieved by 1988. To
a considerable extent, the proportion of earnings other than basic wages represents the
degree of decentralised freedom to determine earnings that employers then possessed. In
1988 this proportion was 46 percent in the sample as a whole, but it varied from 36 to 58
percent among the 10 provinces. We use this as our proxy for the extent of labour market
reform in a province in 1988. Accordingly, Table 7 shows inter-province and inter-city
estimates of the equation:
G0 = a + bW0 (5)10
where W = basic wages as a percentage of earnings. The hypothesis is that b < 0. Indeed,
we find that b is negative in three of the four cases but significantly so only in the
equations for cities. Our evidence that the reforming provinces had higher initial inequality
is weak but it remains our favoured explanation for convergence.
3 Divergence in means
Why study whether mean incomes are converging or diverging across provinces?
Divergence in provincial mean incomes can make an important contribution to income
inequality at the national level. The issue is particularly important in China, for two
reasons. First, both central government, through its fiscal relationships with the provinces,
and provincial governments, through their development policies, have the power to
equalise or disequalise the pattern of provincial economic growth rates. Secondly, the
remarkably low mobility of labour in China, both between provinces and from rural to
urban areas, may prevent or restrict the equilibrating flows of labour that might otherwise
counteract divergence in the urban mean incomes of the provinces.
We approach the analysis of the growth in intra-province mean earnings and incomes in
the same way as for intra-province inequality. First, we test for convergence or divergence
in the means across provinces. Second, we extend the analysis to the sample of cities.
Third, we explore the underlying reasons for the powerful divergence evident in our
equations.
3.1 Divergence in mean income and earnings among provinces
Table 8 provides the basic data on mean real earnings from employment and mean
household real income per capita for each of the ten provinces common to our urban
samples of 1988 and 1995, and the corresponding percentage increases. It is notable that
provinces diverged sharply over the seven years. For instance, earnings per worker rose by
84 percent in Beijing and 79 percent in Guangdong but only by 3 percent in Gansu and 27
percent in Yunnan. The percentage growth in earnings in the coastal provinces is double
that of the interior provinces. Very similar results are obtained for income per capita.
Again, we test for convergence or divergence using the equation:
y1 - y0 = a + by0 (6)
where y = the natural logarithm of mean earnings or income. Table 9 (columns 1 and 5)
shows equations for the growth of earnings and income respectively over the seven-year
period. In both cases the coefficient on the base year value is significantly positive. In the
case of earnings it implies that a ten percent higher initial income involves growth that is
faster by six percentage points; and in the case of income the growth is five percent faster.
This constitutes strong evidence of inter-province divergence in earnings and income
levels. Note the corresponding result in Table 7; comparing the coastal and interior groups11
of provinces, we see that the coastal region had both higher initial mean values and faster
growth in earnings per worker and income per capita than the interior region.
Table 8: The mean values of earnings per worker and income per capita, 1988 and 1995,
at constant (1988) prices, urban China, by province, and their percentage rates of growth
Earnings Income




Beijing 2022 3722 84.1 1612 2933 81.9
Shanxi 1632 2088 27.9 1093 1538 40.7
Liaoning 1835 2449 33.5 1402 1872 33.5
Jiangsu 1895 2950 55.7 1459 2403 64.7
Anhui 1725 2160 25.2 1249 1764 41.2
Henan 1531 2044 33.5 1144 1604 40.2
Hubei 1749 2590 48.1 1307 1994 52.6
Guangdong 2723 4876 79.1 2053 3673 78.9
Yunnan 1988 2514 26.5 1321 1926 45.8
Gansu 1898 1972 3.9 1327 1467 10.6
Coastal 2144 3300 53.9 1584 2502 58.0
Interior 1739 2205 26.8 1177 1632 38.7
Total 1900 2646 39.3 1336 1995 49.3
Notes: The coastal region comprises Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong; the interior region comprises
Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Yunnan and Gansu. The income concept used throughout excludes the housing
subsidy and the imputed rent of privately-owned housing. Because these are based on market rents, which
tend to be high in prosperous provinces irrespective of the quality of housing, their inclusion would raise
income misleadingly in those provinces.
Source: See Table 1.
Table 9 also shows the equivalent equations using official data for all 29 provinces
(columns 2 and 6). Evidence of divergence is again found, although it is not quite so
powerful, nor is it statistically significant in the case of earnings. We are observing a
general phenomenon, which is not just the result of outliers in our ten-province sample.
The same equation estimated for the previous decade (1978-88), using official data for the
29 provinces, is reported in columns 4 and 7 of Table 9. The results are quite different for
this period; they indicate strong and statistically significant convergence of both earnings
per worker and income per capita. Something happened to set different forces in motion
during the later period. One likely explanation is the urban economic reforms—involving
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A further pointer to this explanation is provided by the addition of two proxies for labour
market reform in the 29-province equation for 1988-95 (column 3): the bonus as a
percentage of total earnings, and employment other than by the state or urban collectives as
a percentage of total employment. Both reflect the extent of managerial autonomy; both
coefficients are positive and significant. Moreover, the initial earnings coefficient becomes
slightly negative and not at all significant. It appears that the differential growth of bonus
payments and of the private sector was responsible for the divergence of earnings among
provinces.
3.2 Divergence in mean income and earnings among cities
The equation was re-estimated using the sample of 60 cities. In contrast to Table 9, Table
10 shows no sign of divergence in mean earnings or mean income among cities. The
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. How is the difference in the results
for cities and for provinces to be explained? One possibility is that labour is more mobile
among the cities of a province than among cities of different provinces. Such mobility
would tend to equalise incomes, so producing convergence among the cities of a province.
Table 10: The growth of income per capita and earnings per worker, 1988-95, as a








Mean of dependent variable (y1 -y 0) 0.362 0.324
Number of observations 60 60
Note: None of the coefficients is significantly different from zero even at the ten percent level.
Source: See Table 1.
We test this hypothesis by estimating intra-province income equations for the seven
provinces which contain at least six cities (Table 11). Given such small samples, it is
hardly surprising that only two of the income coefficients are significantly different from
zero. These are in the two provinces—Jiangsu and Guangdong—which have grown fastest
and moved furthest towards a market economy. However, all seven coefficients are
negative and four of them exceed -0.5. In these cases, a ten percent lower initial income
raises the growth rate by over 5 percentage points. Very similar results are obtained for the
earnings equations (not shown). Again, inter-city convergence is most powerful within
Jiangsu and Guangdong.14
Table 11: The growth of income per capita 1988-95, as a function of their initial values, by
cities within provinces, urban China
Shanxi Jiangsu Anhui Henan Hubei Guangdong Yunnan
Intercept 1.252 15.181 ** 4.165 1.999 4.040 7.984 * 1.594
Initial income 0.146 -2.037 ** -0.543 -0.248 -0.511 -0.992 * -0.173
Adj. R
2 -0.239 0.480 0.235 0.140 0.105 0.278 -0.076
F-value 0.034 8.387 ** 2.540 0.140 1.702 3.698 0.508
Mean of dependent variable 0.250 0.443 0.326 0.286 0.421 0.520 0.359
No. of observations 6 9 6 8 7 8 8
Source: See Table 1.
3.3 Explaining divergence
We investigate the reasons for the divergence in province mean earnings and incomes in
two ways. One is to decompose the mean increases into their component parts, in order to
discover which components of earnings or incomes contribute to the divergence. Second,
we decompose the mean differences between four samples (coast, interior; 1988, 1995) in
order to throw light on the reasons for these differences.
Table 12: Growth of income components, urban China, by province, 1988-95 (%)
Province Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Income
Beijing 91.5 113.1 627.8 1537.5 -82.2 82.0
Shanxi 21.6 235.4 261.8 1588.6 -49.4 40.7
Liaoning 29.4 154.4 767.9 834.7 -86.1 33.5
Jiangsu 48.1 161.1 119.6 1162.7 -64.7 64.7
Anhui 20.1 266.5 97.7 8091.5 -81.2 41.2
Henan 16.0 229.7 460.8 460.8 -74.5 40.2
Hubei 46.4 141.0 891.7 681.9 -65.2 52.6
Guangdong 82.6 183.1 222.0 810.8 -85.3 78.9
Yunnan 37.3 145.8 159.2 1309.4 -69.7 45.8
Gansu -0.7 192.7 10.6 800.2 -81.6 10.6
Coastal 58.6 127.0 180.8 768.8 -81.8 58.0
Interior 29.9 145.8 197.1 893.7 -70.9 38.7
Total 44.5 141.4 198.7 817.3 -75.4 49.3
Notes: Y1 = wage income of workers; Y2 = pension and income of retired people; Y3 = earnings of private
owners and self-employed; Y4 = household property income; Y5 = other income. Coastal region includes
Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu and Guangdong; interior region includes Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Yunnan and
Gansu.
Source: See Table 1.
The components of growth in income per capita are reported in Table 12. Apart for ‘other
income’ (Y5), wage income (Y1) tended to grow least rapidly. Income involving capital15
(from self-employment (Y3) and from property (Y4)) grew most rapidly, both on the coast
and in the interior. Table 13 shows that divergence of income per capita across provinces is
overwhelmingly due to the behaviour of wage income. Indeed, the other sources of income
all have significantly negative coefficients in the second column, indicating that these
components actually converged across provinces. It is therefore necessary to investigate
the reasons for the divergence in earnings.
Table 13: The contribution of income components to the divergence of income across
provinces, urban China, 1988-95
Coefficient on the explanatory variable
Explanatory variable: Initial income (y0) Initial component income (yi0)
Wage income 0.861 *** 0.878 **
Pension -0.451 -0.260 *
Income from self-employment 0.115 -0.730 ***
Property income -0.552 -0.844 ***
Other income -1.412 * -0.830 **
Notes: ***denotes statistical significance at the one percent, **at the five cent level, and *at the ten percent
level. The analysis relates to the ten provinces for which common urban samples are available in 1988 and
1995. The dependent variable is the proportionate growth in the income component (yi1 - yi0).
Source: See Table 1.
Table 14 shows the percentage growth in the components of earnings in each province
between 1988 and 1995. The growth in basic wages (E1) generally exceeded that in total
earnings, as did the growth in the cash value of subsidies (E3), whereas bonuses (E2)g r e w
less rapidly, and they actually fell in the interior region. The decline in the share of wages
paid in the form of bonuses may be misleading. Bonuses were unimportant prior to the
urban economic reforms that commenced in 1984. The proportion rose from 13 percent in
1983 to 19 percent in 1988; this trend was not confined to the state sector. The proportion
rose further, to 22 percent, in 1993. However, in 1994 a dramatic increase in the basic
wage occurred in the government sector, and this was generally followed in the enterprise
sector. Employers responded to the wage reform by paying the basic increase partly from
bonus funds. In 1994 the average wage rose by 8 percent in real terms, but this comprised a
rise in ‘non-bonus income’ (mainly the basic wage) by 18 percent and a fall in the bonus
by 13 percent of total pay. The consolidation was not reversed in 1995: the share of the
bonus was down to 16 percent. It is plausible, therefore, that the bonus, being the payment
most subject to managerial and least subject to government control, was the dynamic
element primarily responsible for the growth of earnings, and its spatial divergence, over
much of our seven-year period.16
Table 14 Growth of Earnings Components, Urban China, by Province, 1988-95 (%)
Province E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Increase in
earnings
Beijing 85.5 95.9 68.6 -38.6 85.6 84.1
Shanxi 46.4 -7.0 71.1 -26.9 -15.3 28.0
Liaoning 58.0 -24.5 33.5 300.4 -2.0 33.5
Jiangsu 79.4 33.2 71.0 -61.1 -18.5 55.7
Anhui 65.8 -40.5 -11.4 79.1 6.3 25.2
Henan 32.9 -6.9 82.6 540.8 5.3 33.5
Hubei 63.9 5.7 47.2 107.3 27.2 48.1
Guangdong 86.8 65.7 98.3 60.2 65.6 79.1
Yunnan 42.7 -31.3 90.1 39.1 -44.1 26.5
Gansu 24.3 27.5 -5.4 -86.2 -46.3 3.9
Coastal 64.0 29.8 61.7 11.9 24.8 53.9
Interior 43.3 -18.5 40.8 26.8 -15.0 26.8
Total 53.8 9.8 50.9 11.4 5.5 39.3
Notes: E1 = basic wage of workers; E2 = bonus of workers; E3 = cash subsidy of workers; E4 = earnings of
private owners and self-employed; E5 = other income.
Source: See Table 1.
We estimate the inter-province equations:
ili o o y ya b y −= + (7)
ili o i o y yc d y −= + (8)
where yij = log of earnings component i per worker in year j,
yj = log of total earnings per worker in year j.
Equation (7) indicates whether each component contributes to the divergence of earnings
(b > 0), and equation (8) whether each component itself diverges over the period (d >0 ) .
Table 15 shows the contribution made by each component of earnings to the divergence in
the growth of earnings across provinces. Only self-employment earnings have the wrong
sign, and the contributions of bonuses and subsidies are important. For instance, a 10
percent higher initial level of earnings raise the growth of bonuses by 13 percent, and that
of subsidies by 7 percent. However, the importance of the basic wage in total earnings
means that it contributes more in absolute terms to the divergence. We see from the second
column that bonuses and subsidies, rather than basic wages, are themselves subject to the
strongest divergence.17
Table 15 The contribution of earnings components to the divergence of earnings across
provinces, urban China, 1988-95
Coefficient on the explanatory variable
Explanatory variable: Initial earnings (y0) Initial component earnings (yi0)
Basic wage 0.481 * 0.018
Bonus 1.296 0.466
Cash value of subsidy 0.747 0.218
Earnings from self-employment -0.715 -0.788
Other earnings 0.825 0.215
Notes: *denotes statistical significance at the ten percent level. The analysis relates to the ten provinces for
which common urban samples are available in 1988 and 1995. The dependent variable is the proportionate
growth of the earnings component (yi1-y i0).
Source: See Table 1.
We decided to pursue the distinction between the coastal and the interior provinces. In
1988 the ratio of coastal to interior mean earnings was 123 percent, and in 1995 it was 150
percent. The ratio of 1995 to 1988 mean earnings was 154 percent in the coastal provinces,
and 127 percent in the interior provinces. To what extent was the growing divergence
between the two regions due to growing regional differences in the mean income-earning
characteristics of workers and to what extent was it due to growing regional differences in
the income-generation process itself? We attempt to answer this question by conducting
standard decomposition analyses of the difference in mean earnings both between the two
regions and between the two years:
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() () () ()

















where i, j = 1995, 1988 or coast, interior, a bar over a variable indicates its mean value, and
x is a vector of explanatory variables. The first term measures the component attributable
to the difference in mean characteristics and the second term the component attributable to
differences in earnings functions. The alternative decomposition is:
( ) () () ijj i j yy f f f −= − + − i jii x xxx (10)
The competitive market prediction is that the income-generation mechanism should be the
same everywhere. However, endowments of workers’ characteristics could differ spatially,
and it is this that would produce spatial differences in means (and in inequality) in a fully
competitive economy. China does not have such an economy: we see in Table 16 that the18
earnings difference between the coast and the interior in both years was due entirely to
differences in coefficients and not at all (the effect was negative) to differences in
characteristics. Similarly, we see that changes in coefficients were overwhelmingly
important to the increase in mean real earnings between 1988 and 1995 in both regions.
Table 16: Decomposition analysis of the difference in mean earnings in urban China,
coast-interior, 1988-95
Percentage of the difference in mean earnings that is due to
Coefficients Mean values
Coastal provinces
Equation (9) 68.8 31.2
Equation (10) 90.0 10.0
Interior provinces
Equation (9) 67.1 32.9
Equation (10) 81.1 17.9
Coast-interior
1988
Equation (9) 110.4 -10.4
Equation (10) 109.6 -9.6
1995
Equation (9) 101.0 -1.0
Equation (10) 106.4 -6.4
Source: See Table 1.
It is worth exploring further which explanatory variables contributed most to that part of
the mean earnings gap which was attributable to the difference in coefficients (Table 17).
In comparing the coastal and interior regions, we see that the intercept term was crucial in
1988, accounting for some 95 percent of the total. This represented the characteristics
omitted from the earnings function analysis (male, aged 25-29, 0-3 years of education,
Han, not a Party member, production worker, in state sector manufacturing, self-
employed), i.e. what might be regarded as urban basic unskilled labour.
The mean real earnings difference between the regions attributable to coefficients rose
from 450 to 1140 yuan per annum over the seven years. In 1995 education accounted for
no less than half of this difference, having had a slight negative effect in 1988. The
intercept term accounted for the other half. In addition, ownership had a positive effect and
age a negative effect. Age, the key determinant of earnings under central planning, was
better rewarded in the interior than at the coast. Of crucial importance were the differential
returns to education. The premium on higher education relative to 0-3 years of primary
school was 92 percent at the coast, and 49 percent in the interior. This helped to raise the
relative mean earnings of coastal workers. It appears that pressure of demand for educated
workers in the coastal provinces raised their pay and contributed to the divergence of
earnings among provinces.19
Table 17: The contribution of each worker characteristic to the regional difference n mean
earnings attributable to coefficients, urban China, 1988 and 1995
1988 1995
Equation used: (9) (10) (9) (10)
Intercept 94.1 94.9 57.7 54.7
Sex -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.1
Age 13.8 13.1 -12.8 -13.3
Education -13.9 -14.5 53.0 49.0
Party member ship -4.5 -4.0 4.3 3.8
Minority status -1.9 -1.1 -3.0 -1.6
Ownership category -19.9 -22.9 17.1 20.5
Occupation 5.1 4.6 -2.9 -2.9
Employment status 11.4 12.0 -17.2 -15.0
Sector 16.7 18.9 5.0 5.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: See Table 1.
4 Conclusions
Using the urban samples of the CASS national household surveys of 1988 and 1995, we
established two interesting results which deserve attention and explanation. First, there was
a tendency for intra-province inequality in both earnings per worker and household income
per capita not only to rise in each province but also to converge across provinces. The
same tendencies were to be found at the regional (coastal-interior) and city levels.
Secondly, there was a tendency for both province mean earnings per worker and mean
household incomes per capita not only to rise in each province but also to diverge across
provinces. This paper was concerned to establish these patterns and then to explain them.
We did better in achieving our first objective than in achieving our second. We explored
various avenues but could not produce conclusive explanations.
Our analysis to decompose inequality by source indicated that the basic wage was the most
important reason for the general increase in earnings inequality. Moreover, the basic wage
made the greatest contribution to the convergence of earnings inequality across provinces
although other sources were themselves more powerfully convergent. The one exception
was bonuses, which were divergent. With regard to inequality of income, wage income
was the main reason for the increased inequality in the coastal region but it made no
contribution in the interior region, where pensions were crucial. Wage incomes made the
greatest contribution to the convergence of inequality across provinces but all components
of income other than pensions were convergent.
The fact that convergence of earnings inequality appeared to be stronger for ‘staff’ than for
‘workers’, and for non-state than for state employees, suggests that market forces played a20
role in producing convergence. It is likely that the uneven timing of reforms also played a
role: those provinces and cities that reformed early had greater inequality in 1988 but a
smaller increase in inequality thereafter. Our proxy measure of the extent of labour market
reform in 1988 did indeed have a positive effect on inequality in that year.
Our analysis of the inequality of inequality appears to break new ground. Given
competitive markets all round, the spatial convergence of income or earnings inequality
would require that economies become more alike in their distribution of productive
characteristics among households or workers. However, markets in China have by no
means been competitive throughout. They became more competitive between 1988 and
1995, although the process was spatially uneven. We explained convergence in terms of
the process and timing of market reforms in different provinces and cities.
The most dynamic component of income growth was income from capital but wage
income made the greatest contribution and pensions were also important in the interior.
The divergence of income per capita across provinces is due to the behaviour of wage
income, as all other components actually converged. The decomposition of the growth in
mean earnings showed basic wages to be the main, and the most dynamic, component.
Basic wages also made the largest contribution to divergence, although bonuses and
subsidies were themselves subject to stronger divergence.
A decomposition analysis of the difference in mean earnings in coastal and interior
provinces showed that it was due entirely to the difference in their income-generation
processes. The widening of the difference over the seven years was partly due to the
relative improvement in the pay of unskilled labour and partly to the sharper rise in the
premium on education in the coastal provinces. This last finding suggests that market
pressures for scarce labour were a driving force. Another indication that market forces
were at work is the finding that mean earnings converged among the cities of a province
but diverged among provinces, i.e. mobility of labour limits divergence and assists
convergence.
Bonuses are the component of wages over which enterprises probably have greatest
autonomy. Their part in our story therefore deserves scrutiny. Being dependent on the
profitability and negotiating power (over soft budgets) of enterprises, bonuses tend to
segment the labour market by enterprise. Walder (1987) argued that bonuses are fairly
equally distributed within the enterprise, reflecting worker pressures and preferences.
However, there may be as many work units as households in our urban sample. We found
bonuses to be the most disequalising component of earnings. Bonuses were more
unequally distributed among workers, and also among provinces, in 1995 than in 1988,
probably because of greater segmentation among enterprises. For instance, Knight and Li
(2004) found powerful wage segmentation among firms according to profitability in 1995,
the result of profit-sharing and lack of labour mobility. Bonuses do not help to explain the
inter-province convergence of earnings inequality that we observed; indeed, their effect is
divergent. Bonuses are also an important source of the inter-province divergence of mean21
earnings. The share of bonuses in earnings fell over the seven years. They may
nevertheless have been the driving force behind the growth of earnings, a role which could
have been concealed by the consolidating wage reform of 1994.
The policy of permitting state-owned enterprises to pay bonuses was intended to improve
incentives for efficiency, at least at the level of the enterprise. However, the continuing
weakness of both product market and labour market forces made possible large differences
in enterprise profitability and thus in enterprise pay. Bonuses weakened the convergence in
the inequality of wages and incomes and strengthened the divergence of mean wages and
incomes. Convergence of mean incomes among economies is consistent with models of
technological diffusion and with neo-classical growth models of closed economies. It is
also consistent with increased factor mobility across economies. There is much evidence of
conditional economic convergence around the world. However, we found economic
divergence among the regions of urban China. The most plausible explanation is the
relative lack of factor mobility and the weakness of market forces. The former permitted
very different income-generation functions to exist, and the latter permitted wages in
general, and bonuses in particular, to be influenced by rent-sharing behaviour as well as by
local supply and demand conditions.
If our interpretations of the results are correct, two policy conclusions follow. First,
economic reform may have a once-for-all and finite effect on inequality. At the least, there
is a once-for-all component. The growth of inequality is limited by the processes that
produced cross-province convergence in inequality. Secondly, although divergence in
mean earnings, and thus in incomes, may continue across provinces, further reform of the
labour market—assisting labour mobility, removing the policy restrictions on migration
across provinces, between rural and urban areas, and among cities, and giving more rein to
market forces in the slower reforming provinces—can slow it down and may eventually
reverse it. Nevertheless, forces of cumulative causation appear to be at work in the Chinese
economy, which may keep divergence going for some years yet.
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